On September 9, 2025, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and Shin Bet carried out a targeted strike in Doha, Qatar, aimed at senior Hamas officials, including Khalil al-Hayya, a key leader in the group’s Political Bureau, along with others such as Mohammed Darwish, Mousa Abu Marzouk, Zaher Jabarin, and possibly Khaled Mashaal. The operation, which reportedly killed several Hamas figures while taking measures to reduce collateral damage, has sparked debates about its legality under international humanitarian law (IHL) and the law of self-defense. Qatar condemned the strike as a “cowardly” violation of its sovereignty and international norms, while Israeli leaders praised it as a necessary action against those responsible for the October 7, 2023, massacre and ongoing hostilities. This incident highlights the tensions in applying IHL to non-state armed groups operating from third countries, raising questions about targeting criteria, extraterritorial self-defense, and the “unwilling or unable” doctrine. Based on historical precedents and legal frameworks, this analysis argues that such strikes can be lawful when targeting leaders essential to hostilities, provided they meet standards of distinction, necessity, and proportionality.

Hugo Grotius, the father of international law, articulated a fundamental principle in 1646: “it is permissible to kill an enemy” (The Laws of War and Peace, III, XBIII(1)-(2)). Enemies include regular soldiers, up to organizational leaders (Yoo, 74). All means are lawful to attack and kill the enemy, whether by drone, airstrike or planted explosive (Parks, 5). The relevant questions are whether Hamas political leaders are a lawful target, and whether Israel may legally strike in Qatar.

Status of Hamas political leaders

The Hamas Politburo, formally known as the Political Bureau, serves as the organization’s primary decision-making body and executive leadership structure, responsible for setting overarching policies, strategic directions, and coordinating Hamas’s activities across political, social, and operational domains. Comprising around 15 members elected by the consultative Shura Council, the Politburo operates primarily in exile (e.g., in Qatar or other locations) to avoid direct threats. It derives its authority from the broader Shura Council’s support, functioning as a central hub for high-level governance. At the same time, regional bureaus handle localized affairs in areas like Gaza, the West Bank, the diaspora, and among prisoners. While often portrayed as the “political wing”, analyses highlight its involvement in enabling hostilities, including decision-making that supports terrorism against Israel.

In the context of the ongoing non-international armed conflict (NIAC) between Israel and Hamas, strikes on Hamas’ political leadership can be deemed lawful under international humanitarian law (IHL) based on established approaches to targeting members of non-State armed groups. According to one prominent view, membership in an armed group defines one as a fighter in a non-international armed conflict (Dinstein, NIAC in International Law, 77). Mere group membership makes one a valid target, regardless of actual engagement in combat (Mack and Reeves, 334, 353). According to the US DoO Law of War Manual, “like members of an enemy State’s armed forces, individuals who are formally or functionally part of a non-State armed group engaged in hostilities may be made the object of attack because they likewise share in their group’s hostile intent.” (5.8.3). The ICTY Appeals Chamber in the 2004 Blaskic Judgement held that “if he is indeed a member of an armed organization, the fact that he is not armed or in combat at the time of commission of crimes, does not accord him civilian status (par. 114). This framework underscores that Hamas’ political leaders, by virtue of their integral roles in the organization’s structure and operations, embody a continuous threat that aligns with IHL’s principles of distinction and military necessity.

Complementing this, the Israeli Supreme Court’s ruling in HCJ 769/02 provides an alternative yet supportive lens, treating members of terrorist groups like Hamas as civilians who lose protection only during direct participation in hostilities (DPH), as per customary IHL such as Article 51(3) of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. However, the Court explicitly addresses the “revolving door” issue, where leaders might alternate between planning attacks and claiming immunity during lulls, by interpreting DPH broadly to include ongoing involvement in hostilities—such as authorizing rocket launches, funding militants, or coordinating strategies. Similarly, the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on DPH (2009) states that “individuals whose continuous function involves the preparation, execution, or command of acts or operations amounting to direct participation in hostilities are assuming a continuous combat function… [c]ontinuous combat function requires lasting integration into an organized armed group acting as the armed forces of a non-State party to an armed conflict” (p.34). Even according to this relatively restrictive paradigm, Politburo leaders are indeed integrated into the wider Hamas apparatus and work to advance the organization’s goals, namely the violent dissolution of the state of Israel.

Under both the membership and DPH approaches, the Hamas Politburo leaders were valid targets. These roles are documented in intelligence assessments and reports; for instance, Khalil al-Hayya has been linked to coordination with Iranian officials in the lead-up to October 7, while Zaher Jabarin‘s involvement in planning suicide attacks is evidenced by his oversight of West Bank operations. Furthermore, the leaders were allegedly meeting to discuss Hamas’s position regarding Israeli hostage negotiations. Hostage-taking is a hostile act of terrorism, in which the Hamas leaders were complicit. As these leaders are presumed to be making decisions about releasing hostages, this indicates they are engaged in the continuous process of keeping hostages, which can be seen as part of an ongoing armed attack against Israel or, at a minimum, projects their activities into the territory of Gaza on a sustained basis. Under international humanitarian law, hostage-taking qualifies as direct participation in hostilities (DPH), as it involves acts that adversely affect the military operations or capacity of a party to the conflict. While there may be valid questions regarding targeting purely civilian leadership of non-state groups in control of territory, these were Hamas’s senior leaders in charge of coordinating Hamas’s war and holding of Israeli hostages.

After the invasion of Afghanistan, countries recognized that a state subjected to attack could resort to force against a terrorist organization operating in a third country, especially if that third country was unwilling or unable to act (see Bethlehem). This principle, known as the “unwilling or unable” test, was officially supported by the coalition that fought ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

In 2014, the US, joined by the United Kingdom, France, and others, launched a military offensive targeting ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Iraq asked for support from Western nations, while Syria opposed foreign intervention. As a result, Western countries could not justify their actions in Syria based on the host country’s request or consent. In a letter to the UN Secretary General, US ambassador Samantha Power defended the campaign against ISIS, claiming that Syria lacked the capacity and willingness to confront the group itself.

In October and November 2015, ISIS executed terror attacks in France and the Sinai, killing over eight hundred people. Subsequently, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2249, which described ISIS as “an unprecedented global threat” and called for “all possible means…to eliminate ISIS havens in Syria.” While Res. 2249 offers evidentiary support for the ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine in practice, it also provides a Chapter VII basis for strikes, demonstrating how such interventions gain legitimacy.

Many countries explicitly endorsed the “unwilling or unable” standard, amongst them the US, Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Canada and Australia. Absent the “unwilling or unable” test, states would have no recourse against terrorist organizations harbored by hostile third states.

Though Israel struck Hamas leaders in Qatar, it did not strike Qatari targets nor hold Qatar itself responsible for Hamas’ actions. There is a strong argument, however, to hold Qatar responsible based on the doctrine of state responsibility (ARSIWA). Crawford argues that there are several alternative bases to hold states accountable to terrorism (State responsibility: The General Part, p.157). States are responsible for preventing terrorist attacks planned and launched from within their territory (see Corfu Channel (UK v. Albania), ICJ Rep. 1949 p. 4, 22. Also Spanish Zone of Morocco (Spain/ United Kingdom), (1925) 2 RIAA 615; Island of Palmas (Netherlands/US), (1928) 2 RIAA 829) . In Bosnian Genocide, the Court found that Serbia and Montenegro failed their obligation of due diligence by not taking “all measures to prevent genocide which were within its power, and which might have contributed to preventing the genocide.” (43, 221) Crawford also points to the numerous terrorism-related conventions. The financing or granting of refuge to terrorist groups would be a violation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, triggering state responsibility under ARSIWA Article 4. Article 16 of the ARSIWA holds states responsible for aid or assistance in the commission of an international wrongful act, such as terrorism financing, bombings or hostage taking.

However, the “unwilling or unable” doctrine has significant limitations. It remains controversial in international law because it is not codified in the UN Charter and depends on evolving customary practice after 9/11. Critics contend that applying it to states that mainly provide political or financial support—without being the direct source of an armed attack—could threaten territorial sovereignty and justify unilateral interventions, possibly contravening Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. For example, scholars note that merely harboring or funding, as in Qatar’s case, might not meet the threshold of “armed attack” under Article 51 unless it clearly enables imminent threats. However, this extension can be legally justified if such support sustains command structures central to ongoing hostilities, as shown by state practice in operations against al-Qaeda affiliates and ISIS, where financing networks were targeted under self-defense claims. In Qatar’s case, applying the doctrine is therefore defensible if intelligence indicates direct links between hosted leaders and active planning. Still, it highlights the importance of rigorous evidence standards to prevent overreach and setting dangerous precedents.

Qatar’s Ties with Hamas

Qatar has long served as a key patron and safe haven for Hamas, providing both political legitimacy and substantial financial support that enable the group’s operations. Prominent Hamas leaders such as former chief Khaled Meshaal (residing in Doha from 1999-2001 and again since 2012 after expulsion from Syria), assassinated leader Ismail Haniyeh (living there since 2019), and Mousa Abu-Marzouk (who fled to Qatar at the onset of the current war) have been hosted in the emirate, allowing them to coordinate activities from exile. Based on these documented hosting arrangements, an assessment of Qatar’s role suggests active facilitation rather than mere tolerance. Financially, Qatar has served as Hamas’s financial backer since at least 2014 , and has transferred over $1.8 billion to Hamas in Gaza overall (with estimates reaching $2.1 billion including recent pledges), including a $500 million pledge for rebuilding after the 2021 military operation and cash deliveries like the $15 million suitcase brought through the Erez Crossing in 2018. Qatar’s state-owned Al-Jazeera network further amplifies Hamas’s messaging, broadcasting exclusive recordings from leaders like Mohammed Deif and Ismail Haniyeh on October 7, 2023, inciting violence against Israel. From these factual contributions, scholars and policymakers assess that this support is rooted in ideological alignment with the Muslim Brotherhood, of which Hamas is an offshoot, and positions Qatar as a mediator in conflicts while bolstering the group’s resilience.

In conclusion, the September 9, 2025, strike on Hamas leaders in Doha aligns with established IHL principles, considering Politburo members as targetable due to their functional roles in hostilities under both status-based and DPH frameworks. Qatar’s harboring of these figures invokes the “unwilling or unable” doctrine to justify extraterritorial action. Although Qatar’s condemnation highlights sovereignty concerns, precedents like US operations against al-Qaeda and ISIS show that self-defense against non-state threats can override such claims when the host state enables, rather than prevents, the danger. Ultimately, while case-specific assessments—including verified intelligence and efforts to minimize collateral damage—are crucial, this operation emphasizes the evolving application of IHL in asymmetric conflicts and underscores the importance of strong accountability measures to prevent escalation and uphold humanitarian norms.