By: Raphael BenLevi
From the first days of the State of Israel’s existence, the realist war doctrine brought victories, the removal of existential threats, and regional power status. The doctrine’s three principles are: understanding the root of conflict as hostility towards Jewish sovereignty; an offensive, control-of-territory approach; and self-reliance. The abandonment of these principles in favor of an idealism of making peace with undefeated enemies; a defensive approach; unilateral withdrawals and international dependence, brought about deteriorating security conditions that reached their depths in the October 7 massacre. A return to the realist principles is a prerequisite for Israel’s security and future prosperity.
Back in 1957, Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett described the argument between the two competing approaches to Israeli strategy thus:
“One is an outcome of the belief held by some people, that the Arabs only understand the language of force … The State of Israel must from time to time, clearly prove that she is strong and capable of using force decisively and efficiently. If she does not prove this, then she could be wiped off the face of the earth. As for peace, the latter says that this, in any case, is doubtful, or at least very remote. If peace should come about, this could only be after the Arabs have become convinced that it is impossible to vanquish our state…
What do others say who propose another course? They say that the question of peace should never be absent from our minds for one single moment. It is not only a political orientation; in the long run it is a crucial question of security. Without belittling the importance of day-to-day security, we must always take into account the issue of peace. We must control our reactions”.[1]
From then until today, both approaches Sharett describes have existed side by side among Israeli leadership, and the struggle between them carries on.[2] A review of Israel’s seventy-seven years shows that the first four decades from Ben-Gurion to Begin were dominated by the first approach, while the second gained ascendance from the nineties onwards. In this last period, Israel’s strategic environment and the security challenges that led to the outbreak of the War of Redemption (Swords of Iron) were shaped. The current war may well be the turning point, when Israel returns to the first approach.
The security doctrine that was inspired by Ze’ev Jabotinsky and took form under the leadership of Ben-Gurion had many components, but was based on three realist principles: understanding the root of the conflict as Arab hostility towards Jewish sovereignty, which meant that peace could be achieved only after clear victory; a preference for offense, initiative use of force and control of territory; and the recognition that state security should remain in Jewish hands, since no one would fight on our behalf. Adherence to these principles shaped the doctrine that led Israel to a position of security and the elimination of immediate existential threats, up to the mid 1980’s.
The Core Principles of the Realist Doctrine
The Root of the Conflict. This principle establishes that Arab hostility stems from opposition to Jewish sovereignty within any borders whatsoever, and cannot therefore be appeased through compromises; only force and decisive victory can ensure Israel’s survival. Ben-Gurion adopted this insight from Jabotinsky, who had already determined in the 1920s that Israel’s security was achievable only through a long-term strategy compelling the Arab world to come to terms with its existence.[3] In Jabotinsky’s time, this position contradicted the prevailing view, according to which economic prosperity would lead the Arabs to reconcile with Jewish national aspirations.[4]
Offense and Initiative. The Israeli goal has always been to defend its population against threats, not to expand its borders for the sake of expansion. However, it sought to do this through an offensive fighting doctrine, that includes preemptive operations, preventive and retaliatory actions, and conquest of strategic territories.[5] Downstream from this, Israel acted to transfer the battle front to enemy territory as quickly as possible and to achieve rapid victory in its wars.[6] Additionally, this principle dictates that at the center of military action should be a maneuverable ground army, with the air force supporting it in its efforts to conquer territory.[7]
Self-Reliance. This principle establishes that Israel alone is responsible for its security, and should not lean on foreign forces to fight in its place. Within this framework, it must strive for maximum independence in military industry as well.[8] This principle stemmed largely from the lessons of the Holocaust, which made it clear that the nations of the world would not defend the Jews.[9] This principle also gave rise to the Israeli nuclear project, designed to ensure supreme existential deterrence capability.[10] Self-reliance doesn’t negate cooperation with world powers, but rather emphasizes that Israel’s willingness to fight, and its independent capability are what make it a desirable and valuable ally for any power with interests in the Middle East. Support from a superpower does not translate into alignment with that power on every one of its own preferences, but rather into identifying its broad interests and assisting in their realization while advancing Israel’s goals.[11] In was with such a paradigm that the Jewish Yishuv (settled population) in the Land of Israel acted with Britain against the Ottoman Empire and in World War II; that Israel received help from the Soviet Union, through Czechoslovakia, in 1948; that it benefited from French support in the 1950s against common enemies in Egypt and North Africa; and finally, that it succeeded in creating its alliance with the United States beginning in 1968 because of its strategic value in the Cold War.
Although this was the dominant doctrine at the time of Ben-Gurion, opposing voices made themselves heard. Prominent among them was Moshe Sharett. Sharett, along with a minority among the left wing parties (Mapai, Labor Unity and Mapam), rejected all three principles. He thought the Israeli-Arab conflict could be solved in the near future not by the threat of military might, but rather by its limitation, and suggested a reliance on superpowers to restrain Arab hostility. Sharett sought a dialogue with Egypt in exchange for American assurances, and opposed the “reprisal operations” in response to terror attacks, Operation Kadesh and the Israeli nuclear project.[12]
Results of Realist Doctrine Implementation: A Secure and Victorious Israel
As a rule, the realist doctrine led Israel from the War of Independence until after the First Lebanon War, and served it successfully as it neutralized its enemies’ will to continue fighting against it in one arena after another. In the War of Independence, toward the end of the British Mandate in May 1948, the Jewish Yishuv initiated Plan D – to take control of strategic territories, open routes to Jerusalem, and eliminate the local Arab forces that operated against Jewish residential areas.[13] This series of operations created territorial continuity and gave Israeli forces the control of central areas, making it possible to counter the attacks of Arab armies that followed the Declaration of Independence. Subsequently as well, Israel acted to shape borders while recognizing its right to control them, and understanding the need to create defensible borders that would ensure the survival of the Zionist project.
In Operation Kadesh, Israel acted on its own initiative to change the problematic security reality vis-à-vis Egypt and the Gaza Strip, while preserving common interests with France and Britain. Against the background of the Fedayeen terror attacks, the closure of the Straits of Tiran, and the Egyptian military buildup, Israel conquered the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip.[14] Although Israel ultimately withdrew under international pressure, it achieved commitments for the demilitarization of Sinai, for stationing an international observer force, and for freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran. It also proved itself to have a maneuverable military force, thus granting itself a decade of deterrence. These commitments provided the political and legal basis for Israel’s claim that the blockade of the straits in May 1967 was grounds for the Six-Day War.
The unambiguous victory in the Six-Day War, in which Israel again implemented an offensive doctrine to shape its borders, together with the “Black September” crisis in 1970, when Israel threatened (in coordination with the United States) to act against Syria if it invaded Jordan,[15] led to Jordan’s removal from the circle of hostile nations and its transformation into a covert ally – which bore fruit shortly thereafter in its non-participation in the Yom Kippur War. Control of the Judean and Samarian mountain ridge and the Jordan Valley, as well as the Golan Heights and Sinai, fundamentally changed Israel’s strategic situation. The demonstration of its military capabilities also decided the position of the United States, which has since then viewed it as a strategic asset to be supported, not as a burden doomed to defeat.[16]
In the Yom Kippur War, Israel refrained from a preemptive strike and paid a heavy price for it, but its rapid recovery and renewed implementation of the realist doctrine turned the war into a military victory,[17] which was subsequently translated into removing Egypt as an enemy neighbor.[18] The development of Israel’s nuclear capabilities also helped convince Egypt to end its state of hostility.[19]
The First Lebanon War in 1982 is remembered in public memory as less than glorious, but in fact, it succeeded in bringing about the expulsion of the PLO leadership and fighters from southern Lebanon while distancing them from Judea and Samaria, and an end to the shelling of the country’s north within about two months.[20] In addition, the battles against the Syrian Air Force in Lebanon created a prolonged deterrence vis-à-vis Syria, which had been forming a readiness to fight Israel even without Egypt. The Israeli presence in the security zone kept Hezbollah down as a pursued guerrilla organization, and prevented it from developing into a terrorist army.[21]
Implementation of the realist doctrine, which was also expressed in the strike against the nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981, transformed Israel from a small and threatened community into a powerful state with defensible borders, while eliminating the existential threats from Egypt, Jordan, the PLO, Syria, and Iraq. When it took the initiative, Israel won its wars quickly and decisively. The series of victories turned it into an asset in the eyes of the United States and led to increased American support, despite the fact that in most of these cases Israel acted without Washington’s approval, and even contrary to its position.
Rise of the Idealist Doctrine
The great success of the realist doctrine in eliminating existential threats to Israel allowed part of its leadership to doubt the continued relevance of its principles. The gravitational pull of idealism in times of wellbeing is a well-known historical phenomenon that poses an obstacle to societies of plenty, who for several generations have no experience of war. Idealistic voices were always present, but for the state’s first forty years they were not decisive in fateful decisions. Towards the end of the 1980’s, the core principles of realism were steadily eroded until these voices took up the reins of power and established opposite principles, to wit:
The Conflict Can Be Resolved Through Compromise and Economic Prosperity. In contrast to the realist principle that views war as a permanent phenomenon of the human condition, the end of the Cold War saw the emergence of the idea that a new historical period had begun, one with no major wars.[22] Similar to the position against which Jabotinsky had argued, Israeli leftwing politician and later Prime Minister Shimon Peres claimed that economic prosperity was more important for achieving security than military might, and that poverty was at the root of the spread of Islamism in Arab societies. Therefore, security would be achieved through improving economic conditions in the region, especially among the Arabs of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.[23]
Defense as a Strategic Principle, and the Loss of Territory’s Importance. The belief that major wars would no longer occur gave rise to the idea that technology made control of territory less vital. Although technological advantage always played an important role in warfare, it was not previously considered a substitute for the control of strategic territory. The new argument was that holding territory was unnecessary, and security could be achieved within the borders that were agreed upon by Israelis and Arabs. Additionally, the claim arose that in asymmetric wars between a state army and terrorist organizations, victory was meaningless, since the state side is at an inherent disadvantage.[24] Accordingly, defensive measures – which previously were only meant to support offensive power – became a central strategic principle, and air power was perceived as a possible substitute for ground forces.[25]
Reliance on International Forces, on the International Community, and on International Law. In contrast to the principle of self-reliance, the willingness to lean on foreign actors increased. It was argued that new threats, such as missiles from distant countries, required international cooperation and collective security.[26] Accordingly, Israel expected the Palestinian Authority to act against terrorism in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza; relied on UNIFIL to operate in southern Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah of its weapons; and asked the international community – primarily the United States and Europe – to lead the struggle against the Iranian nuclear project.[27] The erosion of the principle of self-reliance was also expressed in the reduction of local defense production capabilities and the closure of production lines throughout the 2000s.[28]
At the same time, these years saw an unprecedented encroachment of international law considerations into security issues. Although Israel had never ignored international law, its relationship to it had been utilitarian: used to justify its actions in the international arena. From the 1990’s, humanitarian law considerations became institutionalized in the IDF, and the attitude changed from useful to essential and value based.[29] This came about in tandem with the growing power of the judicial branch of government and legal advisors over government rule. In particular, from the year 2000, the international law department in the IDF expanded its authority to give operational legal counsel on the ground, thus integrating legal considerations into operational activity.[30] Concurrently, the High Court of Justice increased its interference in matters of national security, with the view that this was necessary to protect Israel in international institutions.[31]
Results of Idealist Doctrine Implementation: Israel Encircled by Existential Threats
Since the close of the First Lebanon War, Israel was sucked into a strategic downward spiral: the hope for peace led to withdrawal, which dealt a fatal blow to Israeli deterrence, strengthening its enemies and bringing about a renewal of attacks, which in turn created pressure for more withdrawals and further encouragement of enemy forces. This spiral reached its low point on October 7, with the worst terror attack in Israeli history. The Jibril deal in 1985, when Israel released more than one thousand terrorists in exchange for three soldiers, marks the beginning of this process.[32] Many of those released became the leadership of the first Intifada, among them head of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza Ahmed Yassin, who established the Hamas movement upon his return.[33]
The First Intifada convinced the Oslo Accords architects that Israel must bring back Yasser Arafat from Tunisia in order to appoint the PLO as the governing entity over the Arabs of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. Within the framework of the Accords, Israel relinquished security control over Area A territories, in the hope that the PLO would prevent terrorism there. In practice, the PLO, in coordination with Hamas, controlled the terror war of the 1990s behind the scenes.[34] This wave of terrorism, together with then Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s hopes to end the conflict through extensive concessions to Arafat, encouraged the unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in the spring of 2000, ahead of the Camp David talks.
The withdrawal from Lebanon encouraged Arafat to launch a new wave of attacks – the Second Intifada – only five months later,[35] and this wave created the pressure that motivated Ariel Sharon to withdraw from the Gaza Strip in 2005. In the past, territorial concessions were made only as part of a formal peace agreement, with security guarantees (for example, the withdrawal from Sinai was in exchange for a peace agreement with Egypt, which included the demilitarization of Sinai and the stationing of an American observation force). This was not the case with the withdrawals from Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, which abandoned territories to terrorist organizations with no political compensation and without establishing adequate security mechanisms. Governments estimated that it would be possible to gather behind a new border, build walls and fences, and develop technological defenses, hoping to gain international legitimacy to act forcefully in response to any attacks coming from these territories without Israel being considered an “occupier.”
Simultaneously, the assumption that a conventional invasion of Israel was no longer a real threat prompted the decision to transform the IDF into a “small and smart army” – with emphasis on advanced technologies, virtual command and control systems, defense against ballistic missiles, reliance on the air force and intelligence, and use of precision-guided missiles – while eliminating the need for a large and maneuverable ground force.[36] The reduction of ground forces strengthened the withdrawal process, and nearly eliminated the possibility of reconquering the territories withdrawn from if necessary.
The combination of these trends were expressed in the Second Lebanon War, which was viewed as the test case for the new military doctrine – the air force taking center stage and the ground forces acting as an auxiliary power. The war ended with no clear victory, and Hezbollah carried on firing missiles on Israel to its last day. Israel agreed that an international force in South Lebanon would oversee the demilitarization of Hezbollah, something which never happened, allowing instead a tremendous buildup since then. Although Israel did cause a lot of damage in Lebanon, Iran’s standing in the region was strengthened, and Hezbollah boosted its status as a central regional power. Concurrently, Iran continued to enrich uranium, while Israel tried to stall it with covert operations, waiting for world powers to lead the opposition to a nuclear Iran.[37]
Thus was the situation created where Israel was surrounded from North to South by terrorist armies with the capability to rain down missiles the length and breadth of Israel as well as stage a ground invasion, while Iran crossed all red lines Israel had set for its nuclear capabilities. On the eve of October 7, the IDF had neither plans to conquer Gaza nor the armament or local industrial capacity necessary to sustain long-term fighting. Throughout this period, Israel acted to stop the increasing deterioration: canceling some of effect of the withdrawal from A Areas in the “Defensive Shield” military operation in 2002; taking action against the Syrian nuclear facilities in 2007; building a force to attack Iran in 2009 and almost putting it into use in 2010. However, the trend didn’t change: as Israel hesitated, abandoned territory, adopted defensive measures and acted reactively with no objective of unequivocal victory – its strategic position deteriorated.
The Implications of Returning to the Realist Doctrine
The War of Redemption clearly revealed the price of abandoning the realist doctrine; the continued relevance of its principles now stand out in sharp relief. A renewed implementation of these principles has already begun; however, the real question is whether Israel can apply them long-term in the current day and age.
The Root of the Conflict. Today it is clearer than ever that the root of the conflict is not territorial, but rather our enemies’ radical rejection of the Zionist idea. This determination is certainly true regarding Hamas, where economic prosperity provably did not lead to moderation, and it is largely true also regarding the Arabs of Judea and Samaria and the Palestinian Authority leadership. The goal must therefore be to shatter their vision of destroying the State of Israel – breaking their will to continue the hundred-year war against Jewish sovereignty in the land. It is also clear that the perpetuation of the Palestinian Authority’s rule in Judea and Samaria will not produce the profound change required. However, if we understand the problem correctly, we can formulate realistic ways of coping that have a chance of success.
Offense, Initiative, and Territory. In many arenas (except Gaza), significant achievements were recorded due to initiated offensive action and territorial conquest: the operation against Hezbollah in October 2024 and the strategic points held in Lebanon; the destruction within days of the Syrian army’s capabilities and the creation of a buffer zone; Operation “Rising Lion” against Iran and the strike against Hamas leadership in Qatar – all of these attest to a return of the realist doctrine. The challenge is to continue acting with determinedly to prevent the renewed buildup of Hezbollah, to preserve our hold on the strategic territories in Lebanon and Syria in the face of expected pressure to withdraw, and to remain prepared to launch a surprise preemptive strike against Iran at the appropriate time. In the Gaza arena the situation is mixed: throughout a year and a half of fighting, no decision was made to strive for rapid victory and territorial conquest; rather, the IDF operated to raid territories temporarily. In Operation “Gideon’s Chariots” (May 2025), this approach was changed and the IDF did remain in the conquered territories but still did not strive for rapid defeat of the enemy – mainly because of constraints arising from the hostage issue. As of the writing of these lines, the war objective of eliminating Hamas’s governing and military capabilities in Gaza has not yet been achieved, and Israel controls approximately half the territory.
Self-Reliance. The disparity between the IDF’s needs in this war and Israel’s ammunition stockpiles and defense production capacity proved the necessity of rehabilitating the defense industry – and the process of rebuilding has indeed already been initiated. In the first year and a half of the war, under pressure from the Biden administration, Israel was required to refrain from action in Gaza and other arenas and settle instead for very partial achievements. However, the leadership’s determination to change the state’s security situation led to Israel now being perceived as a force that the region must take into account, and as a more vital partner to the United States. The national challenge is to reshape the relationship with Washington and gain the status of a full and vital partner. The Prime Minister’s declaration (January 2026) on phasing out American military aid funding over the coming decade signals that Israel is moving in this direction. The main test for this principle will be in Gaza. The emerging framework of an international committee to manage the Strip is potentially contradictory to the principle of self-reliance. The question is whether Israel will itself oversee the disarmament of Hamas and prevent its return to power, or whether it will entrust this task to foreign forces.
This past century changed Israel from a small community governed by the British Mandate to a regional power. A bird’s eye view shows how adherence to the realist doctrine led to this achievement, while its abandonment led to the situation in which Israel was encircled by the threat of invasion of terrorist armies from both North and South together with the threat of missile attacks that could overwhelm its defenses, while a nuclear threat loomed on the horizon, such that a simultaneous battle on all fronts constituted an existential threat. The re-adoption of the basic principles of realist doctrine are not a choice, but the only way to ensure Israel’s existence and prosperity for the coming decades.[38] The War of Redemption provides us with the opportunity to reverse the trend that led us to disaster; history will judge whether we were wise enough to understand this and change our course accordingly.
Dr. BenLevi is a Senior Fellow at the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy, Major (res.) in the IDF Intelligence Branch and Director of the Churchill Program at the Argaman Institute.
[1] Moshe Sharett. “Some Reflections on the Years 1947-1957”, Extracts from an address at Beit Berl delivered in October 1957, ‘Moshe Sharett and his Legacy’ site. https://www.sharett.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=en&ID=880900_sharett_new&act=show&dbid=MS_articles_eng&dataid=21 .
[2] For more on the two approaches, see Raphael BenLevi, Cultures of Counterproliferation: The Making of US and Israeli Policy on Iran’s Nuclear Program 69–102 (2024); Uri Bar-Joseph, “The Paradox of Israeli Power”, 46(4) Survival 137, 149 (2004).
[3] Ze’ev Jabotinsky. “The Iron Wall”, Jabotinsky Institute, first published in Russian in Razsviet, 4.11.1923 https://en.jabotinsky.org/media/9747/the-iron-wall.pdf
[4] For the pre-State disagreement, see Anita Shapira. The Dove’s Sword: Zionism and Force 1881-1948 [Hebrew]. Tel Aviv: Am Oved (1992).
[5] Yigal Allon. A Curtain of Sand [Hebrew], third edition (1981).
[6] Ariel Levite. Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine 25 (Routledge 2020) (1990).
[7] Dan Horowitz. “The Israeli Concept of National Security” in: Asad, T., Owen, R. (eds) The Middle East. Sociology of “Developing Societies”. Palgrave, London (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17282-5_4 ; Israel Tal. National Security: The Few Against the Many (Dvir, 1996).
[8] Eliot A. Cohen, Michael J. Eisenstadt & Andrew J. Bacevich. “Israel’s Revolution in Security Affairs”, 40(1) Survival 48 (1998).
[9] Ibid at 50.
[10] Raphael BenLevi. “The Evolution and Future of Israeli Nuclear Ambiguity”, 29 Nonproliferation Rev. 243 (2022).
[11] Efraim Inbar. Israel’s National Security: Issues and Challenges Since the Yom Kippur War 86 (2007).
[12] Avner Cohen. Israel and the Bomb 48 (1998). For further detail see Gabriel Sheffer, Moshe Sharett: Biography of a Political Moderate 808–856 (1996).
[13] Elhanan Oren. “War of Independence – Aims, Phases, Battles and Results” [Hebrew] in Alon Kadish (ed.) Israel’s War of Independence 1948-1949 [Hebrew] (2004).
[14] Dov Ben-Meir. The Israeli Defense Establishment: History, Structure, Policy, [Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth, 2009)
[15] Ibid.
[16] Michael B. Oren. Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East: 1776 to the Present 530 (2007).
[17] Tal, supra note 7.
[18] Emmanuel Navon. The Star and the Scepter: A Diplomatic History of Israel, The Jewish Publication Society (2020).
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ben Meir. Supra note 14.
[21] Raphael BenLevi “Seven Myths on Lebanon” [Hebrew] HaShiloach journal (2023). See also Dalia Dassa Kaye, “The Israeli Decision to Withdraw from Southern Lebanon: Political Leadership and Security Policy”, 117 Pol. Sci. Q. 561, 567 (2002).
[22] Inbar. Supra note 11 at 88.
[23] Shimon Peres & Arye Naor. The New Middle East 100 (1993).
[24] Charles D. Freilich. “Why Can’t Israel Win Wars Any More?”, 57(2) Survival 79 (2015).
[25] Dan Meridor and Ron Eldadi. Israel’s National Security Doctrine: The Report of the Committee on the Formulation of the National Security Doctrine (Meridor Committee), Ten Years Later, INSS https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Memo187_11.pdf
[26] Inbar. Supra note 11 at 97.
[27] Raphael BenLevi. “From Supporting Actor to ‘Whipping the P5+ 1’: Assessing Material and Ideational Influences on Israeli Policy Toward the Iranian Nuclear Program” (1996–2015), 40 Compar. Strategy 563 (2021).
[28] The Israel State Comptroller report for 2014 pointed out that “given the significant reduction in the shekel defense budget in the years preceding the Second Lebanon War, there was a reduction in weapons procurement, including from Israeli production. This caused some of the defense industries’ production infrastructure to deteriorate, with production capabilities reduced, production infrastructure getting outdated, and heavy ammunition lines at IMI (Israel Military Industries) and the production line of Ammunition Type A at Israel Advanced Technology Industries atrophied due to a lack of orders…” State Comptroller, “National Production Infrastructure in the Defense Industries,” Annual Report 65b (2014).
[29] Amichai Cohen & Stuart A. Cohen. “Israel and International Humanitarian Law: Between the Neo-realism of State Security and the “Soft Power” of Legal Acceptability”, 16(2) Isr. Stud. 1, 6 (2011).
[30] Ibid at 10.
[31] Amichai Cohen and Stuart Cohen. Israel’s National Security Law: Political Dynamics and Historical Development, Routledge (2014).
[32] Moshe B Ya’alon. The Longer, Shorter Path, Gefen Publishing House (2020).
[33] Liat Mednick and Yaniv Ofek. The Jibril Deal [Hebrew] Center for Educational Technology (2007).
[34] Ya’alon, supra note 32.
[35] Shimon Shiffer. Warning Lights: Secret Talks with Amos Gilead, [Hebrew] Yedioth Ahronoth, (2019).
[36] Efraim Karsh, “From Oslo to Be’eri: How the 30-Years-Long Peace Delusion Led to Hamas’s 10/7 Massacres”, 30 Isr. Affs. 795, 804–805 (2024).
[37] BenLevi, supra note 2.
[38] For an expanded discussion on what the realist doctrine could look like today, see A New Strategic Agenda for Israel [Hebrew] Raphael BenLevi (ed.). Argaman Institute (2025).
