Summary:

A fundamental principle in democratic regimes is the subordination of the armed forces to civilian authority. In Israel, the military – the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) – is subject to the authority of the government by law (Basic-Law: the Military). For this authority to be effectuated, the government must have effective oversight over both the buildup of military power and its operation.

Despite the legal and democratic obligation imposed on the military to obey instructions from the elected political echelon, compliance with these instructions is not self-evident. Situations may arise in which various command levels do not fully understand the instructions of the elected officials, or where junior commanders do not fully understand government instructions conveyed to them indirectly by senior commanders. Additionally, senior military command may at times disagree with directives from the elected officials, and attempt to dissolve their execution in practice. Other factors, such as unforeseen developments within or outside the military, can create some disparity between the goals defined by the government and their execution by the military, creating the necessity to respond to these changes accordingly.

When examining governmental oversight of the military-security domain, special attention should be given to that carried out within the framework of ministerial committees, which are intended to enable the government to focus its work on defined and diverse policy areas.

This essay seeks to present the general picture of the ministerial committees dealing with oversight of military security as has been in practice in Israel for nearly a quarter of a century: beginning in 1999, at the commencement of the 28th government’s term and a year before the outbreak of the Second Intifada, and ending in 2022, at the close of the 36th government’s term, less than a year before the outbreak of the Swords of Iron War. In the future, when the meeting protocols of these ministerial committees are gradually revealed to the public, a more detailed and accurate picture of the oversight they exercised will be made possible.

Legally, the government is permitted, in general, to establish ministerial committees and declare their decisions to be government decisions. Working within the framework of ministerial committees allows the government to distribute its workload between the plenum and subsidiary bodies, and enables ministers to focus and specialize in various fields, including in the area of military security. Such committees also allow for greater discretion – particularly vital in matters of security- both by sealing its records for longer periods of time and by the more restricted number of individuals with access to sensitive information.

In the first quarter of the twenty-first century, four ministerial committees were tasked with addressing issues related to military force building, and in doing so, overseeing force building processes.

1. The Ministerial Committee on National Security was established by law in 1992, and its composition stipulated in 2001: The Prime Minister is the chairman of the committee and its members include the Deputy Prime Minister if appointed, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of National Security, and the Minister of Finance. In addition, the government is entitled to add members to the committee, per the Prime Minister’s proposal, provided that the total number of committee members does not exceed half the number of government members. Additional committee members serve to represent the different parties within the governing coalition. Additional ministers have also been invited to committee meetings as observers.  Over the years, the number of members has varied. Increases in number provided greater representation to a wider scope of views but also negated some of the benefit of a smaller working group. Some PMs convened smaller, informal cabinet forums for security decision making, in addition to the ministerial committee likely at least in part for this reason.
   An important element of the committee is the consistent membership of individuals with experience and familiarity with military security. Such familiarity had been developed either through long-term service in the defense establishment (the IDF or other security bodies); previous service in a government or Knesset committee position dealing with military security (primarily in the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee); or a combination of both. Their knowledge base created the potential for professional oversight by the committee over the military, including its force building processes. Additionally, most governments that served during the period under review defined the Committee’s areas of authority, including issues related to military force building, to varying degrees of detail. However, not all components of military force building were discussed systematically or in depth, such as the military budget at the beginning of the period examined.
2. The Israel Military Procurement Ministerial Committee was established during the period under review (2003), and was intended to enable the government to focus and professionalize its supervision of the expansion, development, and budgeting of military force-building. This committee took six years to begin its work, and was not convened during the 34^th government. Its primary mission is to assess and ratify military procurements and projects that exceed a stipulated amount. Since 2012, the committee is presented, alongside such proposals, with the relevant important issues and assisted by the opinion of a professional team. This contributed to increasing the government’s potential for supervision through one of its committees over the budgets of the military and the Ministry of Defense.
3. The Ministerial Committee on Reserve Affairs was established pursuant to the 2008 Reserve Duty Law to examine all aspects relating to the reserve forces, including the rights of reserve soldiers, their obligations, the compensation to be paid to them, and more, and submit an annual report to the government on its work. The committee was tasked with addressing a specific budgetary issue –compensation for reserve soldiers, and its activities focused on supervising the reserve component within the military personnel recruitment policy. This committee has also always included Members familiar with the defense establishment, a fact that has contributed to the committee’s ability to oversee the reserve system.
4. The Ministerial Committee for Privatization has since 1993 also been connected to the field of military force building, as it pertains to the privatization of government companies engaged in the development of weapons and combat support systems. The Government Companies Law states that this committee be chaired by the Prime Minister, alongside the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Justice, and the government may add up to two additional members to the committee. The committee is authorized to decide on the privatization of a government security company through various methods, after careful consideration that takes into account its objectives and operational characteristics, the justification for privatization, and in what manner it should be done. After a decision has been made to privatize a government security company, the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, with the Minister of Defense, are authorized to issue an order to protect vital state interests in connection with the company being privatized. This includes preventing the exposure or disclosure of confidential information for security or diplomatic reasons. These detailed provisions allow the government to supervise security companies that had in the past been under its ownership and which continue to provide important products and services to the military as a customer. In other words, the ministerial committee, the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Finance have the responsibility and authority to safeguard vital interests and classified information involved in the operations of security companies. Throughout the period under review, the ministerial committee included Members with varying degrees of familiarity with the defense establishment, which contributed to the committee’s professionalism.

As more protocols from the discussions of these four ministerial committees during this period are revealed over time, we will be better able to assess the quality of supervision they exercised over the IDF’s force building in the first quarter of the twenty-first century. This study should serve as a springboard for further research on this topic in the future.

For the full introduction in Hebrew. See the full publication in the online legal journal, Reshut HaRabim (“The Public Domain”) [Hebrew].